While several West African nations are choosing either to reaffirm historic ties with France or to forge deeper partnerships with Russia, Togo is charting a more complex and carefully balanced course — one that reflects both regional ambition and domestic political calculation.
The attempted military coup in neighbouring Benin on 7 December offered a revealing snapshot of this approach. As the plot collapsed, its alleged leader, Lt Col Pascal Tigri, reportedly slipped across the border into Togo before moving on to seek asylum elsewhere, possibly in Ouagadougou or Niamey. Although no official confirmation has been given, the episode highlighted the quiet but influential role Togo continues to play in the region.
The lack of clarity surrounding Lomé’s involvement is characteristic of the governing style of , who has ruled the country in various capacities for nearly two decades. Under his leadership, Togo has become adept at maximising diplomatic leverage by maintaining cordial relations with competing global and regional powers.
The Togolese authorities have been careful not to openly support any challenge to , with whom relations are correct but cautious. Both countries remain members of the (ECOWAS), an organisation already under strain following a wave of military takeovers in the Sahel.
At the same time, Lomé has openly cultivated warm ties with the military-led governments of , and , all of which formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January and have since aligned themselves more closely with Moscow.
Crucially, Gnassingbé has also signalled to France — Togo’s long-standing international partner — that Lomé has alternatives. On 30 October, hosted the Togolese leader at the Élysée Palace in talks aimed at reinforcing bilateral cooperation. Yet fewer than three weeks later, Gnassingbé was in Moscow for a high-profile meeting with .
That Moscow visit produced tangible outcomes. The two countries approved a defence cooperation agreement allowing Russian naval vessels access to the port of Lomé — one of the most modern deep-water ports along West Africa’s coastline and a vital logistics hub for landlocked Sahelian states. The deal also covers intelligence sharing and joint military exercises, although Togolese officials insist there are no plans to host the Russian-backed Africa Corps, the successor to the disbanded Wagner Group.
Beyond defence, the visit included agreements on economic cooperation and the formal reopening of Togolese and Russian embassies, both of which had been closed since the 1990s. In contrast to the relatively understated Paris trip, the Moscow engagement was widely publicised and symbolically significant.
Unsurprisingly, these developments have unsettled France, which once counted Togo among its most reliable allies in West Africa. In the aftermath of the Benin coup attempt, Paris was quick to underline its readiness to support ECOWAS with rapid military assistance to defend constitutional order — a message aimed as much at regional capitals as at Lomé.
Togo, however, insists that its outreach to Russia does not represent a break with Western partners. Officials describe the policy as a pragmatic diversification of international relationships rather than a geopolitical pivot.
There is some logic to this claim. In recent years, Togo and Gabon joined the while retaining membership of the . Conversely, English-speaking , a long-standing Commonwealth member, joined the Francophonie last year.
Many West African governments argue that external observers are too quick to frame such choices as a zero-sum competition between former colonial powers or as a revival of Cold War-style alignments. From their perspective, cooperation with one partner need not preclude engagement with another.
Nowhere is this philosophy more evident than in Lomé’s regional economic strategy. Togo’s capital is a major freight and aviation hub, with a port capable of handling the world’s largest container ships and an airport linking cities across West and Central Africa. The city also hosts regional banks and financial institutions, helping to broaden the economic base of a country whose rural communities remain among the poorest in the region.
Geography further reinforces Togo’s importance. The country lies along the critical Lagos–Abidjan transport corridor, a flagship development project for ECOWAS. Remaining central to the bloc is therefore in Lomé’s economic interest, even as it maintains ties with the breakaway (AES) — a group that Togo’s foreign minister, , has publicly suggested Togo might one day join.
Yet this outward-facing diplomacy is inseparable from developments at home. In 2024, sweeping constitutional changes transformed Togo’s political system. The presidency, previously subject to term limits, was reduced to a ceremonial role, while executive authority was transferred to a new position — president of the council — with no term restrictions. Gnassingbé stepped into this role after handing the presidency to a loyal ally, effectively resetting the clock on his rule.
The reforms sparked public anger, but protests were swiftly suppressed. Activists, journalists and opposition figures report intimidation and arrests. Prominent critics, including rapper and former defence minister , have faced legal threats. Authorities accuse demonstrators of violence and warn against what they describe as misinformation on social media.
International concern has mounted. In September, the adopted a resolution calling for the release of political detainees, including Irish-Togolese dual national , imprisoned since 2018. The Togolese government rejected the criticism, insisting its judiciary operates independently.
Through his multi-directional foreign policy, Gnassingbé appears intent on signalling to Western partners that external pressure has limits. By demonstrating that Togo has diplomatic and security alternatives, Lomé hopes to blunt criticism over governance and human rights.
History suggests, however, that domestic discontent cannot be neutralised by foreign alliances alone. Togo has experienced sudden eruptions of unrest in the past, and resentment over political reforms remains close to the surface. In a recent state-of-the-nation address, Gnassingbé hinted at possible prisoner releases, instructing the justice minister to review certain cases.
That small gesture suggests an awareness that even the most skilful international balancing act cannot indefinitely substitute for internal legitimacy. As West Africa continues to realign, Togo’s strategy may buy time and influence abroad — but stability at home will ultimately depend on political inclusion and public trust.
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