Islamist militants active in Burkina Faso are now discreetly establishing a logistical and medical network in Ghana’s northern regions to support their insurgency, according to information obtained from seven sources, including Ghanaian security officials and regional diplomats.
These sources have indicated that Ghanaian authorities may be largely overlooking the crossings from Burkina Faso, which have seen insurgents accessing vital resources such as food, fuel, and explosives, and even obtaining medical treatment for injured fighters in Ghanaian hospitals.
While Ghana’s lenient stance may have kept it relatively safe from the attacks that have devastated neighboring nations, experts and officials warn that this passive approach may allow militants to lay down roots in Ghana, potentially recruiting from marginalized communities. Ghana shares a lengthy 600-kilometer border with Burkina Faso, where the violent insurgency has led to thousands of deaths and displaced millions. The situation has made the Sahel region a hub of global terrorism, as groups loyal to al-Qaeda and Islamic State expand their operations.
In Burkina Faso, a group linked to al-Qaeda known as JNIM has seized control of large portions of the country, creating severe security concerns. This week, a JNIM leader announced intentions to push further south into Ghana, as well as Togo and Benin, countries not yet ravaged by large-scale attacks. Ghana’s Ambassador to Burkina Faso, Boniface Gambila Adagbila, acknowledged the challenges posed by Ghana’s porous borders, suggesting that insurgents view Ghana as a “safe haven.” However, he denied any suggestion that Ghana had struck a non-aggression pact with the militants, affirming that Ghana was collaborating with Burkina Faso to curb the insurgency.
Ghana, a nation celebrated for its democratic stability, holds elections on December 7, and its government has earned strong relationships with Western allies like the United Kingdom and the United States. These allies frequently commend Ghana’s proactive peace-building efforts in the region. According to Clingendael, a Netherlands-based international relations institute, the absence of direct attacks in Ghana may reflect the insurgents’ strategy of avoiding disruption to supply lines and rest areas. Clingendael’s report, drawing from high-ranking government sources, indicated that Ghana’s authorities have taken precautions to avoid escalating the situation, recognizing that interrupting the militants’ supply channels could provoke hostilities.
A senior Ghanaian security official, speaking anonymously, confirmed that the militants indeed use Ghana as a base to launch operations and receive medical aid. The official explained that these militants are monitored and sometimes provide intelligence to Ghanaian authorities, who occasionally hand them over to Burkinabe authorities. “We’ve arrested many terrorists in the past and handed them over to Burkina,” the official said, adding that Ghana aims to handle the matter discretely to avoid inflaming tensions. Ghana’s Information Ministry has declined to comment on these reports.
The emergence of Islamist militants in West Africa initially centered in northern Mali two decades ago, where local authorities pursued a non-aggression approach. This understanding allowed militants freedom of movement in exchange for refraining from attacks within Mali. But as violence spread following the 2012 jihadi offensive in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger each attempted similar arrangements, only to see them fall apart as insurgents grew stronger or as governments collapsed.
The brutal toll of ongoing conflicts has led to political instability, with military coups taking place in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since 2020. In each case, the new military governments have shifted away from Western allies, opting for Russian support instead. As the Sahel region remains engulfed in insurgency, Western nations are directing their resources towards bolstering coastal nations like Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast, in a bid to prevent the militant threat from spreading further south.
Ghana’s position in these efforts is crucial. In response to questions on why militants have not targeted Ghana directly, a Ghanaian official suggested that militants are unlikely to “destroy where [they] sleep.” Clingendael’s analysis supports this notion, noting that out of 40 recorded incidents since 2015 suspected to be linked to violent extremist groups, only two incidents involved active violence. The rest pertained to instances of militants passing through, seeking recruits, gathering supplies, or using Ghana as a safe haven.
Notably, the use of Ghana as a rear base may have intensified recruitment within Ghanaian communities. According to arms experts, explosive components and detonator cords used in attacks against United Nations and government forces in Mali have been traced to mining operations in Ghana. Aaron Atimpe, an analyst on extremist groups, added that Ghana’s role as a rest and supply center has exposed locals to radicalization. “It is not just an area where they can rest and get supplies. In the process, people are being radicalized and recruited,” Atimpe said.
As Ghana strives to navigate its role in regional security, the delicate balance it maintains with insurgent groups operating across its borders remains a focal point. While Ghana’s strategy has so far shielded it from the violent insurgency impacting its neighbors, the increasing activity within its borders raises concerns about the long-term security implications.
