1. The matter involving businessman Kwabena Adu-Boahene centers on allegations by the Attorney-General and the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) regarding GHS 49,100,000, purported to be the equivalent of USD 7 million. According to the prosecution, the amount was intended for the procurement of a Cyber Defense system for National Security. They assert that only USD 1,750,000 (equivalent to GHS 9,537,500 at an exchange rate of 5.45 at the time) was transferred towards acquiring the equipment, alleging that Adu-Boahene misappropriated the remaining funds.
2. However, this foundational claim by the Attorney-General appears to be flawed. By the very exchange rate cited—5.45—GHS 49,100,000 equates to more than USD 9 million, not the USD 7 million as being asserted. This raises doubts about the integrity of the financial basis upon which the prosecution is building its case.
3. Furthermore, sources within National Security have clarified that the GHS 49,100,000 in question was allocated as “special operations funds.” These were released in Ghana cedis to meet specific operational requirements—not as a USD-denominated transaction. This directly contradicts the Attorney-General’s narrative and suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of how special operations are funded.
The Subject of Special Operations and Funding
- Like other government institutions, National Security and its affiliated intelligence agencies maintain General Administration accounts. These accounts cover standard budget items such as Goods and Services, Compensation, and Capital Investment. They are auditable, and agencies maintain financial records in accordance with formats approved by the Auditor-General.
- In parallel with these standard accounts, National Security operates Special Operations accounts. These accounts fund missions and expenses that are classified as SECRET or TOP SECRET. Due to their sensitive nature, these expenditures are not subject to standard auditing procedures.
- Funding for Special Operations may come from both public and private sources and is often handled in cash. Such funds are typically routed through special accounts, including those managed by Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), to serve designated national security goals.
- In this particular case, what the Attorney-General refers to as “Private BNC” was, according to National Security sources, an authorized Special Operations SPV. It was not a private enterprise for Adu-Boahene’s personal gain, as has been alleged, but rather a vehicle established to meet intelligence and security objectives.
- It is critical to highlight several important clarifications:
i) The Israeli company ISC Holdings, which supplied the Cyber Defense System, has officially confirmed full delivery of the software and equipment. They have also acknowledged receiving full payment. Additionally, the National Signals Bureau has verified receipt and confirmed that the Cyber Defense tools are fully operational.
ii) At no time has National Security, any intelligence agency, or the Auditor-General raised concerns about misuse, misapplication, or misappropriation of funds by Mr. Adu-Boahene in relation to this transaction.
iii) It is inappropriate for EOCO investigator Frank Marshall Cromwell or any other EOCO official to speculate on what National Security’s objectives may have been in 2020. Attempting to interpret the internal strategy of an intelligence agency without access to classified information constitutes an unfounded assumption.
Witness Statements
- A witness, Frank Anane Dekpey—identified as a driver and errand boy—stated that he withdrew funds and delivered the cash to the National Signals Bureau in Labone. This aligns with standard practices in the intelligence community, where cash is often used to fund operational activities. His account contradicts the Attorney-General’s claim that Adu-Boahene withdrew funds for personal use. Moreover, due to his junior role, Dekpey would not be privy to the confidential nature of the operations, rendering his testimony limited in evidentiary value.
- Another witness, Edith Ruby Adumuah, acknowledged in her statement that Special Operations accounts were managed directly by the Director-General and the National Security Coordinator. As such, she was not involved in or aware of the specific transactions concerning the alleged “Private BNC.” This reflects the “need-to-know” structure under which intelligence agencies operate and further discredits the claim that the entity was unauthorized or illegitimate.
